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PROVISIONS REGARDING CAPITAL AND
THE PROTECTION OF CREDITORS
At present, a BV has a required minimum capital of18,000. This requirement is likely to be abolished.It is proposed that Article 178 of Book 2 of the
Code should be amended so as to provide that there is no
need for a minimum capital. The requirement that an
auditor’s statement should be provided in the event of a
contribution in kind which is contained in Article 204b of
Book 2 of the Code will be abolished, but a statement by
the founders or directors of a BV concerning such
contributions will still be required. It will be possible to
denominate the share capital in a currency other than the
euro. There would no longer be any requirement for a
bank statement in relation to contributions in cash.
Furthermore, there would no longer be any need for
authorised capital: if there were such capital, the present
requirement that at least one fifth of it should be paid up
would be abolished. Authorised capital consists of capital
which can be issued without any amendment of the
articles.
According to Article 2.207c of the Netherlands Civil
Code, a BV may give loans for the purpose of the
subscription or purchase by third parties of its shares or
depositary receipts (certificaten) issued up to an amount
which does not exceed the distributable reserves, provided
the articles so permit. This restrictive rule will be repealed
if the new government proposals are adopted by the Dutch
Parliament. At present, a BV is permitted by Article
2.207(2)(b) to acquire up to 50 per cent of its issued
shares. This limitation will be abolished if the new version
of Article 2.207(2) comes into force, according to which
the purchase of the company’s own shares will be
impermissible if this will involve the distribution of
reserves that the company is required to maintain by the
law or the articles, and where the directors foresaw or
ought to have foreseen that after such acquisition the
company would not continue to be able to pay its debts.
RULES GOVERNING DISTRIBUTIONS
The rules governing minimum capital have been
regarded as inadequate as far as the protection of creditors
is concerned. This is also true of certain other rules
relating to the safeguarding of capital. The Dutch
governmental proposals, which seem to have been
influenced by comparative law studies, include the use of a
balance sheet test and a liquidity test, which are intended
to increase creditor protection and provide for more
flexible rules relating to capital maintenance. The balance
sheet test and liquidity tests are used in draft Article 207
and 207a of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, which deals
with the acquisition by a private company (NV) of its own
shares. Draft Article 216 which deals with other
distributions by a private company makes use of the
liquidity test, and also refers to the balance sheet test. The
latter test requires that the amount of the company’s
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statutory reserves and the reserves required by the articles
shall not be depleted as the result of the distribution. The
liquidity test requires that after the distribution, the
company shall be able to pay its debts as they fall due. The
use of these tests appears to be influenced by the American
Revised Model Business Corporation Act.
According to draft Article 207(1), directors have the
task of deciding on share buy-backs by the company. By
draft Article 207(2) of Part 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, the
company may not acquire any shares in itself if this would
lead to a depletion of the reserves that the company must
maintain by law or its articles; or if the directors know or
should reasonably anticipate that after such acquisition, the
company cannot cover its debts as they fall due.
Draft Article 207(3) of Part 2 of the Dutch Civil Code
appears of considerable importance, and is of a very
detailed character. The first sentence of this article
provides that if it transpires that after the company has
acquired shares in itself, it cannot pay its debts as they fall
due, directors who knew or ought to have known of this
situation are jointly and severally liable to the company for
the purchase price together with interest at the statutory
rate. A director who could demonstrate that he did not
know or ought to have known of the wrongful distribution,
and was not negligent in taking measures to avoid its
consequences, would be exonerated from liability.
Draft Article 207(3) will also apply to shadow directors.
If the company acquires certain of its own shares within
one year of becoming bankrupt, and the transferor thereof
knows or ought to have known that the company could not
pay its debts as they fell due, the transferor is liable to the
company for the price of the shares plus interest at the
statutory rate. If the directors had discharged their liability
in accordance with the first sentence of draft Article
207(3), their liability under the previous sentence 3 would
be proportionately reduced. Draft Article 207 of Book 2 of
the Dutch Civil Code will also apply to certificaten.
The rules contained in draft Article 216 of Book 2 are
somewhat more complex than those contained in draft
Article 207, but they are of a generally similar character in
many respects. They apply to distributions in general as
opposed to distributions made to a shareholder whose
shares are acquired by the company.
According to draft Article 216(1), the general meeting is
required when determining the income available in
accordance with the annual accounts, and in determining
expenditures, to ensure that the net equity (eigen vermogen)
is greater than the reserves which have to be maintained as
the result of legal requirements and the articles. By draft
Article 216(2) the general meeting cannot decide upon any
expenditure until the directors have approved it. This draft
provision also requires the directors to refuse such consent
if they know or reasonably anticipate that after the
distribution has been made, the company will be unable to
pay its debts as they fall due. Draft Article 216(3) of Book
2 of the Dutch Civil Code is in generally similar terms to
Article 207(3), and is of comparable complexity. Sentence
1 of this article provides that if the directors are aware or
should reasonably anticipate that after making a
distribution (uitkering) it will be impossible for the
company to pay its debts as they fall due, the directors will
be jointly and severally liable for the amount or value of the
distribution together with interest at the statutory rate. No
such liability is imposed on a director who could show that
he did not know or ought to have known of the wrongful
distribution. Draft Article 216(3) will also apply to shadow
directors.
According to sentence 3 of draft Article 216(3), if the
company makes a distribution within one year of the
opening of bankruptcy proceedings, a person who receives
a distribution within this period of time and who is aware,
or who may be reasonably anticipated to know that after
such distribution, the company cannot pay its debts as they
fall due, must return the amount of the distribution to the
company together with interest at the statutory rate. The
directors may also be held liable to make such restitution
to the company, but their liability would be proportionately
reduced if they had satisfied their liability under sentence 1
of draft Article 216(3).
The new proposed rules governing distributions would
appear to impose a considerable burden on directors.
Certain aspects of thee proposals proposals are considered
in an article by L Lennarts, (“Directors and Shareholders’
Liability: Protecting Creditors of the BV”, 8 EBLR 131,
138-41). It has been suggested that in some cases the
accounts may be somewhat out of date and that the period
to which the liquidity test refers might be limited. It
remains to be seen whether the provisions regarding
distributions will undergo some modification before the
enactment of the new statute. They would appear to be the
most interesting and important elements of the proposed
revisions of the legal regime governing the BV which has
been influenced by comparative law studies. Certain other
aspects of these proposals will be briefly mentioned below.
These include shares and their transfer and the settlement
of disputes.
SHARES AND THEIR TRANSFER
A BV may issue shares of different classes. It follows
from draft Article 228(5) of Book 2 of the Netherlands
Civil Code that voteless shares may be issued. This draft
provision stipulates that shares of a particular class may be
deprived of their vote if all the shareholders agree.
Otherwise, voteless shares may be issued if the articles
provide for the issues of such shares before lot advance.
According to draft Article 192, the articles may impose
additional obligations upon all shares or shares of a
particular class towards the other shareholders or the
company itself. 31
Amicus Curiae Issue 73 Spring 2008
32
Amicus Curiae Issue 73 Spring 2008
Article 2.195 of the Dutch Civil Code used to require
the imposition of transfer restrictions on the shares in a
private company: such a restriction is often thought of as
reflecting the personalistic nature of the company. The
former mandatory blocking clause will, according to the
new draft form of Article 195, no longer be necessary. The
company will be permitted to choose freely transferable
shares, or give existing shareholders a first right of refusal,
or require the agreement of the directors or the general
meeting for such transfers. However, it follows from draft
Article 195(5) of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code
that such transfer may not be rendered impossible, or
unduly difficult (onmogelijk of uiterst bezwaarlijk). There are
no major new proposals governing the management or
supervisory boards of Dutch private companies, including
large ones.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Articles 335-343 of Book 2 of the Civil Code provide for
the remedy of compulsory purchase or compulsory sale of
shares in private companies and in closely held public
companies which limit the transfer of shares in the same
way as a public company. Such companies must only have
registered shares and issue no bearer depository
certificates. This remedy has not been much used in
practice, because of many procedural difficulties enabling
reluctant parties to delay the proceedings for years by
initiating appeal procedures. Many of the relevant
provisions will be revised if the proposed amendments to
Part 2 of the Dutch Civil Code come into effect.
The above amendments will permit the company and its
shareholders to adopt dispute settlement procedures in the
company’s articles or by agreement. It follows from the
new Article 337 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code that the
company must be able to make its own arrangements for
settlement and depart from all or certain of the statutory
provisions, unless that arrangement would render the
transfer of shares impossible or extremely difficult. It will
be possible for disputes to be settled by the Enterprise
Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam or by
arbitration. According to proposed new Article 339(3) of
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code the court will not be
required to appoint experts to determine the price of the
shares of an oppressed shareholder who wishes to leave the
company if it can determine it itself, which would be the
case if the parties agree on the price of the shares, or the
agreement between the company and the shareholders
contains clear criteria for establishing their value. A
shareholder whose rights or interests have been prejudiced
through the actions of other shareholders to the extent that
he can no longer reasonably be expected to remain a
member will, according to draft Article 2.343(1) of the
Dutch Civil Code, be able to be bought by such
shareholders in the company. Draft Article 2.343(4) of
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code will enable a shareholder
who wishes to be bought to request the court to take
account of a depreciation in the value of shares caused by
the activities of the other shareholders or in the company
itself. The provisions governing the settlement of disputes
by the company will also make it clear that a shareholder
who prejudices the interests of the company may also be
bought out.
The new provisions may well increase the popularity of
the Dutch BV, which may come into frequent use as a
subsidiary in other states, as also has the British limited
company in Germany following the decisions of the Court
of Justice in Centros (Case C212/97 (1999) ECR1-1459)
and Inspire Art (Case C-167/02 (2003) ECRI-10155).
However, it should be remembered that Dutch company
law contains a number of rather stringent and complex
provisions, which may not always be found welcome by a
subsidiary of a foreign company. The need for the use of a
notarial form increases the expense of forming such a
company.
Dr Frank Wooldridge
